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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The ideal observer theory of moral judgments fails to constitute the intrinsic worth of a person

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Michael Martin's ideal observer theory analyzes moral judgments as the feelings of approval or disapproval of a perfectly impartial and informed observer
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    • 2.Intrinsic properties are non-relational and mind-independent
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    • 3.Feelings of an observer are relational and mind-dependent
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kantian dignity grounds intrinsic worth in rational autonomy, a property persons possess independently of any observer's affective states.
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    • 2.If ideal observer approval were constitutive of worth, persons would lack worth prior to being observed, which contradicts the unconditional nature of dignity Kant articulates in the Groundwork.
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    • 3.A property that can be withheld by stipulating the absence of an observer cannot be intrinsic in the metaphysically robust sense required for foundational moral status.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.G.E. Moore's open question argument shows that any naturalistic or response-dependent reduction of moral properties leaves a residual normative question, indicating the reduction is incomplete.
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    • 2.If ideal observer approval fully constituted worth, asking 'but does an approved person genuinely have worth?' would be trivially closed, yet the question remains substantively open.
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    • 3.The persistent openness of this question demonstrates that ideal observer responses track worth at best extensionally, not constitutively, leaving intrinsic worth unexplained.
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