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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The 'parāmarśa' (consideration) is the operative condition (vyāpāra) of inferential cognition

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Vyāsatīrtha (Tarkātāṇḍava) argues that perceptual cognition of the hetu alone, not parāmarśa, is the proximate cause of anumāna, making parāmarśa redundant.
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    • 2.If parāmarśa itself requires a prior cognition of vyāpti, then it cannot be the operative condition without generating an infinite regress of prior conditions.
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    • 3.The Mīmāṃsaka tradition (Kumārila, Ślokavārttika) holds that inference operates through śabda-like apprehension of invariable concomitance, not through a synthesizing mental act distinct from perception.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa) contends that parāmarśa collapses the distinction between inference and memory, since it is merely a recollective synthesis of previously acquired cognitions.
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    • 2.If the operative condition of inference is defined by combining prior premises, then dreams and false memories that combine propositions would qualify as genuine inferential cognitions, violating the pramāṇa requirement of producing veridical knowledge.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The operative condition of inferential cognition is an awareness that the locus of inference (p) possesses an inferential sign (h) that is pervaded by the inferred property (s)
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    • 2.This awareness combines the two premises of the argument immediately prior to the conclusion being derived
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    • 3.The combining of premises immediately prior to conclusion is called 'parāmarśa'
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