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    The 'parāmarśa' (consideration) is the operative conditio... — Carmelics
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    The 'parāmarśa' (consideration) is the operative condition (vyāpāra) of inferential cognition

    Causation
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    • 1.The operative condition of inferential cognition is an awareness that the locus of inference (p) possesses an inferential sign (h) that is pervaded by the inferred property (s)
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    • 2.This awareness combines the two premises of the argument immediately prior to the conclusion being derived
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    • 3.The combining of premises immediately prior to conclusion is called 'parāmarśa'
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Vyāsatīrtha (Tarkātāṇḍava) argues that perceptual cognition of the hetu alone, not parāmarśa, is the proximate cause of anumāna, making parāmarśa redundant.
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    • 2.If parāmarśa itself requires a prior cognition of vyāpti, then it cannot be the operative condition without generating an infinite regress of prior conditions.
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    • 3.The Mīmāṃsaka tradition (Kumārila, Ślokavārttika) holds that inference operates through śabda-like apprehension of invariable concomitance, not through a synthesizing mental act distinct from perception.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa) contends that parāmarśa collapses the distinction between inference and memory, since it is merely a recollective synthesis of previously acquired cognitions.
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    • 2.If the operative condition of inference is defined by combining prior premises, then dreams and false memories that combine propositions would qualify as genuine inferential cognitions, violating the pramāṇa requirement of producing veridical knowledge.
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    Topics

    CausationTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language2 linked

    Related

    If parāmarśa itself requires a prior cognition of vyāpti, then it cannot be the ...If the operative condition of inference is defined by combining prior premises, ...Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa) contends that parāmarśa collapses t...The Mīmāṃsaka tradition (Kumārila, Ślokavārttika) holds that inference operates ...
    +4 moreShow less
    The combining of premises immediately prior to conclusion is called 'parāmarśa'The operative condition of inferential cognition is an awareness that the locus ...This awareness combines the two premises of the argument immediately prior to th...Vyāsatīrtha (Tarkātāṇḍava) argues that perceptual cognition of the hetu alone, n...

    Similar

    For the inferential cognition to be true, the consideration (parāmarśa...91%The operative condition of inferential cognition is an awareness that ...87%The 'guṇa' is the condition responsible for the truth of a cognition82%If E is an epistemic condition of cognition of objects, then objects m...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: early-modern-india
    View source passageHide passage
    I will discuss mainly the definition of the ‘pervasion’ relation. First, however, a brief note on how the causal model of knowledge is applied to inference. The ‘special’ instrumental cause (karaṇa) of an inferential cognition is said to be the inferrer’s knowledge of the relevant pervasion relation. The ‘operative condition’ (vyāpāra) is said to be an awareness that the locus of inference (p) possesses such an inferential sign (h) as is pervaded by the property inferred (s). This is, in effect,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit