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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The rational acceptance of foundational presuppositions must be grounded in epistemic rather than pragmatic gains and losses.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Peirce and pragmatist epistemology hold that epistemic and pragmatic rationality are not categorically distinct but differ only in the scope of practical consequences considered.
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    • 2.If long-run community inquiry and truth-tracking are themselves practical goals, then grounding presuppositions in these aims is simultaneously pragmatic and epistemically legitimate.
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    • 3.Wright's sharp epistemic/pragmatic distinction therefore relies on a dualism that pragmatist epistemology has historically and systematically dismantled.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' argues that foundational hinge propositions are not justified epistemically at all, but function as the inherited background enabling epistemic practice.
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    • 2.If hinge commitments are constitutively prior to the epistemic/pragmatic distinction, demanding they be grounded in epistemic rather than pragmatic gains commits a category error.
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    • 3.The claim therefore misidentifies the normative structure governing foundational presuppositions by applying justificatory categories that only apply downstream of those very presuppositions.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If the gains and losses justifying acceptance of presuppositions were pragmatic (e.g., happiness, prestige, wealth), then acceptance would only be practically rational, not epistemically rational.
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    • 2.Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the skeptic about knowledge and epistemic justification, not merely to serve practical interests.
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    • 3.Answering the skeptic about epistemic justification requires that the acceptance be epistemically — not merely practically — rational.
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