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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that There may be no psychological natural kinds corresponding to folk psychological concepts such as belief and desire

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Action is causally overdetermined by both mental and neurophysiological kinds
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    • 2.If neuroscience can provide a sufficient causal account of action, the explanatory role of folk psychological concepts is undermined
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Folk psychological categories like 'belief' are defined by functional roles that cross-cut neural taxonomy in ways that resist systematic reduction (Fodor 1974).
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    • 2.If the extensions of folk psychological predicates are heterogeneous at every lower level of description, no single natural kind corresponds to them (cf. multiple realizability).
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    • 3.Sciences carve nature at joints defined by inductive projectibility; folk psychological predicates fail to support exceptionless, ceteris-paribus-free generalizations (Churchland 1981).
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Eliminative materialism holds that folk psychology is a radically false theory whose ontology will not survive mature neuroscientific revision (Paul Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism,' 1981).
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    • 2.Causal overdetermination by neurophysiological kinds does not vindicate folk kinds—it shows folk kinds are explanatorily idle posits that track no discrete causal structure.
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    • 3.A kind earns realist status only when it sustains novel predictions; folk psychological kinds systematically fail this criterion, as Ramsey, Stich, and Garon argue regarding connectionist models (1991).
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