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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that We never directly experience material things; every experience has sense-data rather than material things as its objects.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Introspective indiscriminability is not a transitive or constitutive relation: two experiences can be indiscriminable yet have numerically distinct objects.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.J.L. Austin demonstrated that 'looks,' 'seems,' and 'appears' locutions do not entail an inner sense-datum object, only a qualified perceptual claim about the world.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The inference from phenomenal similarity to shared object-type commits the 'phenomenal fallacy' identified by Smart: confusing properties of experience with properties of what is experienced.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Gibsonian ecological perception and McDowell's disjunctivism both ground veridical perception in direct causal-relational contact with distal material objects, not mediating sense-data.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If disjunctivism is true, then veridical and hallucinatory experiences are fundamentally different in kind, undermining P1's assumption that all experiences share a common sense-datum object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Every experience stands in the required introspective indiscriminability relation to some experience that has only sense-data as its objects.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from an experience with only sense-data as objects, then it too has only sense-data as objects.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Sense-data are not material things.
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    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.