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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that An inductive argument from intuitions about particular cases of justified belief does not support [P1]

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Many particular epistemic, moral, and modal beliefs seem intuitively no less justified than our empirical beliefs, and some seem more justified
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    • 2.It is implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explanation of the occurrence of our intuitions
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    • 3.[P1] requires that justified beliefs play such an explanatory role regarding our intuitions
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sosa's distinction between animal and reflective knowledge entails that merely having a strong intuition about a case establishes no more than a disposition, not a reliably truth-tracking faculty for normative epistemic facts.
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    • 2.Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich's experimental philosophy data demonstrate that intuitions about justified belief vary systematically across populations, so no stable inductive base exists from which to generalize to P1.
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    • 3.Without cross-cultural and cross-demographic stability, particular case intuitions cannot serve as a legitimate inductive foundation for a universal principle about what justification requires.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Harman's inference-to-best-explanation criterion for justified belief applies asymmetrically: perceptual beliefs causally covary with facts, but intuitions about justified belief do not covary with justification-making features in the same trackable way.
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    • 2.BonJour's internalist cases show intuitions about epistemic justification are sensitive to coherence and conceptual relations, not causal-explanatory connections to the facts intuited, undermining the inductive generalization.
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