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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    An inductive argument from intuitions about particular ca... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    An inductive argument from intuitions about particular cases of justified belief does not support [P1]

    Skepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sosa's distinction between animal and reflective knowledge entails that merely having a strong intuition about a case establishes no more than a disposition, not a reliably truth-tracking faculty for normative epistemic facts.
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    • 2.Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich's experimental philosophy data demonstrate that intuitions about justified belief vary systematically across populations, so no stable inductive base exists from which to generalize to P1.
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    • 3.Without cross-cultural and cross-demographic stability, particular case intuitions cannot serve as a legitimate inductive foundation for a universal principle about what justification requires.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Harman's inference-to-best-explanation criterion for justified belief applies asymmetrically: perceptual beliefs causally covary with facts, but intuitions about justified belief do not covary with justification-making features in the same trackable way.
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    • 2.BonJour's internalist cases show intuitions about epistemic justification are sensitive to coherence and conceptual relations, not causal-explanatory connections to the facts intuited, undermining the inductive generalization.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Many particular epistemic, moral, and modal beliefs seem intuitively no less justified than our empirical beliefs, and some seem more justified
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    • 2.It is implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explanation of the occurrence of our intuitions
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    • 3.[P1] requires that justified beliefs play such an explanatory role regarding our intuitions
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Related

    BonJour's internalist cases show intuitions about epistemic justification are se...Harman's inference-to-best-explanation criterion for justified belief applies as...It is implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explan...Many particular epistemic, moral, and modal beliefs seem intuitively no less jus...
    +4 moreShow less
    Sosa's distinction between animal and reflective knowledge entails that merely h...Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich's experimental philosophy data demonstrate that int...Without cross-cultural and cross-demographic stability, particular case intuitio...[P1] requires that justified beliefs play such an explanatory role regarding our...

    Similar

    An inductive argument for [P1] based on intuitions about particular ca...95%A skeptical argument against intuitions must show that intuition-based...85%To establish that intuitions fail to justify belief, an argument must ...85%Establishing that a class of intuitions is more frequently false than ...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: intuition
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    It has also been argued that [P1] is unjustified (Pust 2001). There appear to be only two ways that [P1] could be justified. It might be justified by being intuitive or by being supported by our intuitions regarding particular cases of justified belief. [P1] is not, however, intuitive. Furthermore, an inductive argument for [P1] based on our intuitions about particular cases of justified belief will not support [P1] since many of what seem, intuitively, to be our most justified beliefs run afoul
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit