Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Death may be bad for those who die, even if they do not e... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Death may be bad for those who die, even if they do not experience dying.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.We are harmed by what makes our lives as wholes worse than they otherwise would have been (the comparativist view).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.In at least some cases, dying at a time makes our lives as wholes worse than they would have been had we not died when we did, because dying cuts our lives short and deprives us of good life.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A subject can only be harmed if there exists a subject to bear the harm at the time the harm occurs (the 'no subject' objection, Epicurus, Lucretius).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.After death, no subject exists to bear the deprivation of future goods.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, deprivation of future goods after death cannot constitute a harm to the deceased.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Comparativist harm requires a determinate counterfactual baseline: a specific alternative life the person would have lived absent the harm (Bradley 2009).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Death forecloses the very conditions under which any particular alternative life would have been actualized, making the counterfactual indeterminate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Where no determinate counterfactual baseline exists, no coherent comparative harm attribution can be made.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    A subject can only be harmed if there exists a subject to bear the harm at the t...After death, no subject exists to bear the deprivation of future goods.Comparativist harm requires a determinate counterfactual baseline: a specific al...Death forecloses the very conditions under which any particular alternative life...
    +4 moreShow less
    In at least some cases, dying at a time makes our lives as wholes worse than the...Therefore, deprivation of future goods after death cannot constitute a harm to t...We are harmed by what makes our lives as wholes worse than they otherwise would ...Where no determinate counterfactual baseline exists, no coherent comparative har...

    Similar

    No matter when it happens, dying is bad for those who die.90%Dying is extrinsically good or bad for those who die only if and insof...84%A person's death is not extrinsically bad for her82%Being dead is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for a person...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: death
    Comparativist view (Nagel 1970, Quinn 1984, Feldman 1991)
    View source passageHide passage
    To argue that death may be bad for those who die (even if they do not experience dying), theorists typically draw upon some version of the comparativist view that we are harmed by what makes our lives as wholes worse than they otherwise would be, and benefitted by what makes our lives as wholes better than they otherwise would be (early proponents of this view include Nagel 1970, Quinn 1984, and Feldman 1991). Applying comparativism, we may claim that, in at least some cases, dying at a time makes our lives as wholes worse than they would have been had we not died when we did, roughly because,...
    Extraction notes

    The passage explicitly presents the comparativist view (premise 1) and its application to death (premise 2) as the basis for arguing that death may be bad for those who die even without experiencing dying, which matches the extracted argument's structure and conclusion.

    Validity:

    Confidence: The argument is explicitly laid out in the passage as the standard comparativist case for the badness of death.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit