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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Experimental subjects in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma settings initially cooperate because they treat the game as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Subjects cooperate in one-shot PD even when framing and instructions explicitly exclude repeated-game reasoning, as Andreoni (1995) demonstrated.
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    • 2.If misframing were the mechanism, cooperation rates would drop to near-zero once subjects are corrected—but they do not fall to Nash equilibrium predictions.
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    • 3.A residual cooperative disposition that persists after correction requires explanation by social preferences or moral norms, not strategic misclassification.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Evolutionary and cultural selection pressures instill unconditional prosocial dispositions, not merely context-sensitive repeated-game strategies, as Sober and Wilson argue in 'Unto Others'.
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    • 2.Genuine altruistic or fairness-based preferences explain cooperation without positing an error in game categorization, making the misframing hypothesis explanatorily redundant under Occam's Razor.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.People rarely encounter one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas in everyday life but frequently encounter repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas with non-strangers
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    • 2.Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas have many Nash equilibria that involve cooperation rather than defection
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    • 3.People apply strategies learned from repeated games when placed into a structurally similar one-shot game
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.