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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law) in nature.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Metaphysical laws (e.g., that identity is necessary) are universal and support counterfactuals just as natural laws do.
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    • 2.If metaphysical laws sustain deductive inference across all possible worlds, D-N explanation extends naturally to metaphysical domains.
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    • 3.Kit Fine and David Lewis both treat modal truths as law-like regularities capable of grounding explanatory entailment.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The 'one-off' premise conflates token uniqueness with type-level inexplicability, since D-N models explain token events via type-level laws.
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    • 2.Hempel himself acknowledged that singular causal explanations are D-N explanations with suppressed universal premises, not exceptions to the model.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Deductive-nomological explanation requires that similar mechanisms give rise to similar phenomena.
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    • 2.Some metaphysical explanations are one-off phenomena, where a similar mechanism need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon.
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    • 3.Deductive-nomological models cannot accommodate one-off explanations.
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