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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W is equal to the a priori probability that P has the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The principle of indifference cannot be coherently applied when the partition of a possibility space admits multiple non-equivalent descriptions yielding different probability assignments.
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    • 2.The family of second-order moral properties lacks a natural, non-arbitrary individuation criterion, meaning any appeal to equiprobability inherits Bertrand-style paradoxes of geometric probability.
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    • 3.Without a privileged partition, the symmetry argument for equal a priori probabilities between rightmaking and wrongmaking properties is undermined by the very formal framework it invokes.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Moral realist traditions from Plato through Ross hold that certain first-order properties—such as being-an-instance-of-suffering—have their normative valence necessarily, not contingently.
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    • 2.If at least some first-order properties are necessarily wrongmaking or necessarily rightmaking, then their second-order moral status is not a matter of a priori equiprobability but of conceptual necessity.
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    • 3.The existence of even one such necessary moral connection defeats the symmetry assumption required for the indifference-based probability claim.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two members of that family, then the a priori probability that something has property P is equal to the a priori probability that it has property Q.
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    • 2.The second-order property of being a rightmaking property of weight W and the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property of weight W belong to a family of mutually exclusive properties.
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