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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Sellarsian dilemma undermines the epistemological role foundationalism requires of experiences

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Foundationalism requires that experiences justify beliefs without themselves needing justification
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    • 2.Non-conceptual awareness of sensations cannot account for the justification of appearance beliefs
      ?

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    • 3.Conceptual awareness of sensations is itself a justified doxastic state and thus cannot serve as a non-doxastic justificatory foundation
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.BonJour's internalist critique establishes that a mental state can confer justification only if the subject has cognitive access to its justificatory status, which transforms the state into a belief-like entity subject to further normative assessment.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If experiences must be representationally contentful to justify beliefs, as Crane and Peacocke argue, then they possess correctness conditions and are assessable as accurate or inaccurate, making them functionally doxastic rather than foundational.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A genuinely non-doxastic state that lacks correctness conditions cannot transmit propositional justification to beliefs about how things appear, as Pryor's dogmatist account implicitly concedes by requiring 'seemings' to have propositional structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wilfrid Sellars's 'Myth of the Given' demonstrates that any epistemic authority attributed to raw sensory states presupposes conceptual capacities that cannot themselves be non-inferentially justified.
      ?

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    • 2.McDowell's attempt to dissolve the dilemma via 'second nature' merely relocates the regress, since the acquisition of conceptual capacities in Bildung itself requires prior epistemic grounding that foundationalism cannot supply non-doxastically.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.