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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Yugoslavian and Rwandan disasters were not initially Prisoner's Dilemmas; most people on either side did not begin by preferring the destruction of the other group to mutual cooperation.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Structural conditions like ethnic outbidding and security dilemmas generate incentive-compatible destruction preferences before overt violence begins.
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    • 2.Posen's 1993 analysis shows that post-imperial power vacuums create genuine PD structures through rational security calculations, not merely elite manipulation.
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    • 3.If the incentive structure produces defection-dominant strategies, the subjective initial preferences of individuals are analytically irrelevant to the PD classification.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Olson's collective action theory entails that latent group preferences are systematically suppressed by coordination costs, making stated preferences unreliable baselines.
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    • 2.A preference for cooperation that cannot survive minimal defection signals from elites was never a robust cooperative preference in the game-theoretic sense.
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    • 3.Therefore, the claim that populations 'preferred mutual cooperation' conflates expressed preferences under safety with revealed preferences under strategic uncertainty.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.In neither the Yugoslav nor the Rwandan situation did most people begin by preferring destruction of the other group over mutual cooperation.
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    • 2.The PD-like structure was dynamically created through coordination logic and political manipulation, not pre-existing.
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