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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that There must be a difference in the world between the properties that the old and new concepts of color experience stand for or denote.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A difference in concepts or modes of presentation does not entail a difference in the properties or referents those concepts pick out (Frege's sense/reference distinction supports this).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mary may acquire a new phenomenal concept of the same physical property she already knew under a physical description, just as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' differ conceptually but refer to the same object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that directly refer to physical-functional states, so no new ontological property is introduced by the new concept.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.David Lewis and Lawrence Nemirow's ability hypothesis holds that Mary gains new know-how—abilities to recognize, imagine, and remember color—not knowledge of new propositional facts about distinct properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If what Mary acquires upon release is a set of practical abilities rather than propositional knowledge of a new property, the inference from 'new cognitive achievement' to 'new property in the world' is a non sequitur.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The phenomenological novelty of gaining an ability is routinely confused with discovering a new fact, but the confusion is a feature of the cognitive situation, not evidence of ontological novelty.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The difference between the old concept (of red as known through physical description) and the new concept (of red as experienced) is substantial enough to indicate a difference in the properties these concepts refer to.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mary knew some of these properties while in her cell, but becomes cognizant of others only upon her release.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.For Mary to make a real discovery, she must come to associate with the experience of red new qualities she did not associate with it in her room.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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