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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that There need not be a conceptual path from concepts or predicates of the reducing science to concepts or predicates of the reduced science for an explanation to count as a reduction.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Explanations are not all-or-nothing; there are degrees of explanatory depth.
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    • 2.Some explanations exceed mere brute-fact postulates without achieving the tight conceptual connections required by those who demand an a priori link between the reduced and reducing science.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nagel's classical model requiring bridge laws was refuted by Putnam's multiple realizability: mental states map onto heterogeneous physical substrates with no uniform conceptual bridge.
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    • 2.Kim's functional reduction shows that causal-mechanistic sufficiency—not conceptual entailment—is what licenses genuine explanatory reduction across levels.
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    • 3.Explanatory reduction succeeds when the reducing science specifies the realizer of the reduced property, even absent any a priori derivation of the higher-level predicate.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Machamer, Darden, and Craver's mechanistic explanation demonstrates that inter-level reduction proceeds via mechanism schemas, not conceptual-definitional linkage between predicates.
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    • 2.The neuroscientific reduction of long-term potentiation to molecular cascades counts as genuine reduction despite no conceptual path from 'memory consolidation' to 'AMPA receptor phosphorylation'.
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