Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Williams' view is an Actual State internalism, not a Coun... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Williams' view is an Actual State internalism, not a Counterfactual Motivation internalism

    Moral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Williams' argument connects reasons to all psychological states relevant to explaining action
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Counterfactual Motivation internalism connects reasons only to counterfactual motivational states
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Williams' argument is more general than Counterfactual Motivation accounts
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Williams' deliberative procedure of 'sound deliberation' requires evaluating what an agent would want under idealized reflection, not merely actual states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A reason grounded in what sound deliberation would yield is structurally counterfactual, since it invokes hypothetical rather than occurrent motivational states.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore Williams' account incorporates a counterfactual element that blurs the boundary between Actual State and Counterfactual Motivation internalism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit and Railton argue that Williams' appeal to 'correction of factual error' within the S entails that the operative reasons-grounding state is the corrected, idealized desire, not the actual one.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the reasons-grounding state is the desire the agent would have after full information and coherent deliberation, the view is functionally equivalent to a Counterfactual Motivation account.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Connections

    3 topics

    No other argument is better1 linkedFree Will & Foreknowledge1 linked

    Related

    A reason grounded in what sound deliberation would yield is structurally counter...Counterfactual Motivation internalism connects reasons only to counterfactual mo...If the reasons-grounding state is the desire the agent would have after full inf...Parfit and Railton argue that Williams' appeal to 'correction of factual error' ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Therefore Williams' account incorporates a counterfactual element that blurs the...Williams' argument connects reasons to all psychological states relevant to expl...

    Similar

    This claim is equivalent to a statement of the Actual State version of...84%Williams' argument for internalism about reasons is stronger than the ...82%Actual State internalism entails that a consideration is a reason for ...79%Reasons internalism states only a necessary condition on reasons, not ...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reasons-internal-external
    View source passageHide passage
    Although Williams’ article is commonly seen as the classic defense of HTR, on this reading it only restricts agents’ reasons to their dispositions to be motivated, and not more narrowly to their actual desires. This is because dispositions are sufficient, and actual desires not necessary, in order to explain why somebody would be motivated under counterfactual conditions. This argument is therefore stronger than the Classical Argument because of its independence from HTM, which controversially c
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Williams' argument is more general than Counterfactual Motivation accounts
    Williams' deliberative procedure of 'sound deliberation' requires evaluating wha...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit