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    Made withinDC&Austin
    A = B (the two spheres are identical), which is absurd gi... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A = B (the two spheres are identical), which is absurd given that one has a scratch and the other does not — therefore the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles fails

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Haecceities (primitive thisnesses) are not genuine qualitative properties and thus cannot ground numerical diversity in a purely qualitative world.
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    • 2.Black's two-sphere universe contains no relational or qualitative asymmetry; any apparent distinction collapses into bare numerical difference, which presupposes rather than explains non-identity.
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    • 3.If non-identity must be explained by a non-qualitative primitive, the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is not refuted but rather shown to govern all genuinely qualitative description, vindicating the claim that qualitatively identical spheres are identical.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's necessity of identity entails that if A and B are numerically distinct, this is so necessarily, meaning the scratch scenario merely reveals a contingent difference insufficient to ground metaphysical distinctness independently of haecceitism.
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    • 2.Adams's anti-haecceitist position holds that all genuine modal facts supervene on qualitative facts, so two spheres indiscernible in all qualitative respects occupy the same modal profile and therefore the same identity.
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    • 3.The supposed absurdity of A=B dissolves once we reject haecceitism: within a purely qualitative ontology, 'two' indiscernible spheres is not a coherent description of one possible world but a notational artifact of an illegitimately enriched modal framework.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Suppose two objects A and B are distinguished only by accidental features: A has a scratch, B does not
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    • 2.It is possible that A has no scratch, so it is possible that A and B are indiscernible
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    • 3.If the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles holds of necessity, then the possibility of indiscernibility entails the possibility that A = B
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    Adams's anti-haecceitist position holds that all genuine modal facts supervene o...Black's two-sphere universe contains no relational or qualitative asymmetry; any...But A ≠ B because A has a scratch and B does not — a contradictionBy the Necessity of Identity, if it is possible that A = B, then it is possibly ...
    +8 moreShow less
    Haecceities (primitive thisnesses) are not genuine qualitative properties and th...If non-identity must be explained by a non-qualitative primitive, the Principle ...If the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles holds of necessity, then the poss...In S5 modal logic (or the weaker system B), possibly necessary that A = B entail...It is possible that A has no scratch, so it is possible that A and B are indisce...Kripke's necessity of identity entails that if A and B are numerically distinct,...Suppose two objects A and B are distinguished only by accidental features: A has...The supposed absurdity of A=B dissolves once we reject haecceitism: within a pur...

    Similar

    A theory cannot coherently entail both that A is identical with B and ...78%Carter's argument against the claim that S and S' are identical fails77%The Weak Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles could be false, b...77%But A ≠ B because A has a scratch and B does not — a contradiction77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-indiscernible
    View source passageHide passage
    Adams may be interpreted as providing two arguments, the first being the continuity argument used above. The second is a modal argument relying on the Necessity of Identity and a suitably strong modal logic. Suppose there are two objects that are distinguished by accidental features, as it might be one of the spheres, A has a scratch, while the other B does not. Then it is possible that A has no scratch and hence possible that the spheres be indiscernible. If the Principle holds of necessity the
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit