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    The future is necessary ex suppositione (conditionally ne... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    The future is necessary ex suppositione (conditionally necessary), though not absolutely necessary

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.God has immutable knowledge of the future
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    • 2.Whatever God knows cannot fail to occur, given that knowledge
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    • 3.It remains logically possible for an immutable God to have known otherwise (absolute necessity does not follow)
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.William of Ockham's distinction between composite and divided sense shows that 'it is possible that P not occur' and 'given foreknowledge, P will occur' operate at different modal levels.
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    • 2.Gregory's ex suppositione framework smuggles in temporal indexing that presupposes a fixed timeline, begging the question against open future theorists like Peter Auriol who denied determinate truth-values for future contingents.
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    • 3.If future contingents lack determinate truth-values prior to occurrence, God's immutable knowledge cannot have a fixed object, undermining the suppositio that generates the conditional necessity.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If God's knowledge is truly immutable, then the proposition 'God could have known otherwise' entails a change in the divine nature, which is impossible.
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    • 2.A necessity that cannot be otherwise in any coherent sense of divine immutability collapses into absolute necessity, not merely conditional necessity.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Divine Attributes3 linked

    Related

    A necessity that cannot be otherwise in any coherent sense of divine immutabilit...God has immutable knowledge of the futureGregory's ex suppositione framework smuggles in temporal indexing that presuppos...If God's knowledge is truly immutable, then the proposition 'God could have know...
    +4 moreShow less
    If future contingents lack determinate truth-values prior to occurrence, God's i...It remains logically possible for an immutable God to have known otherwise (abso...Whatever God knows cannot fail to occur, given that knowledgeWilliam of Ockham's distinction between composite and divided sense shows that '...

    Similar

    The supposition that the future resembles the past is not a necessary ...81%A future event is determined only if a present event is causally or no...78%After God has revealed a future contingency, it is necessary that the ...77%Gregory did not assert that the past is necessary beyond necessity ex ...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: gregory-rimini
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    Gregory’s position relies on interesting uses of common logical devices and distinctions developed at Paris and Oxford over the preceding century, such as the distinction between the composite and divided senses of propositions, and that between conditional and absolute necessity. The purpose of these distinctions was to offer a way of explaining the contingency of events, but in doing so they assumed the ultimate contingency of everything except God. However, far from being an affirmation of th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit