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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable relation is necessary—is a plausible reply that does not collapse into phenomenal conservatism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.If acquaintance with a probability-maker suffices for justification, the view inherits phenomenal conservatism's permissiveness toward any internally coherent but misleading seeming.
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    • 2.The making-probable relation, if grasped via acquaintance alone, reduces epistemic work to phenomenal accessibility, collapsing the structural distinction Tucker's dilemma was meant to preserve.
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    • 3.Conee and Feldman's evidentialist framework shows that acquaintance-based probability relations face the same generality problem as phenomenal states: which relation, under which individuation, counts?
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Requiring acquaintance with both a probability-maker and the making-probable relation generates a vicious regress, since acquaintance with the relation itself demands further epistemic grounding per Sellars's critique of the given.
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    • 2.If the making-probable relation is a brute given of acquaintance, then the view is structurally identical to Pryor's dogmatism, which Fumerton's acquaintance theory was explicitly designed to surpass.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Unlike phenomenal conservatism, the proposal still requires acquaintance with something epistemically relevant to the target proposition.
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    • 2.Acquaintance with a probability maker (and possibly with the relation of making probable) is a substantive epistemic requirement absent in bare phenomenal conservatism.
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    • 3.A view that retains a distinct acquaintance requirement is not equivalent to phenomenal conservatism even if it shares structural features with it.
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